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DECISIONS ABOUT COERCION: THE CORPORATE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
WAIVER PROBLEM
Daniel Richman*
INTRODUCTION
For almost a decade, law reviews and hearing rooms have re-
sounded with cogent arguments that, for corporations at least, the at-
torney-client privilege has been chilled, eroded, attacked, or even
killed by the federal government's misuse of its bargaining leverage.1
Yet it is unclear whether this rhetoric is overstated or understated.
Given that most federal criminal defendants plead guilty, and that an
extraordinarily large percentage of them provide information and tes-
timony against others in order to avoid harsh sentences (or to avoid
being charged at all), one could as easily say that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution are on their last legs, as are the
rules of evidence and other adjudicatory principles. 2
"Death" or, more formally, "waiver" abounds in the federal system,
as does "coercion"-if the term is understood in its ordinary sense.
Put differently, the system's reality bears little resemblance to the re-
gime of robust rights ostensibly promised by black-letter procedural
law.3 This disjunction can be disturbing to outsiders, but insiders have
* Professor, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Sam Buell, Dan Capra, Jim Comey, Lev Das-
sin, Michael Dreeben, Jill Fisch, Brandon Garrett, Lonny Hoffman, Peter Margulies, Julie
O'Sullivan, Cathy Seibel, Bill Simon, and Richard Squire for their generous assistance.
1. See, e.g., Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469 (2003);
William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (2006); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink
of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 147, 147 (2000) ("The sound you hear coming from the corridors of the Depart-
ment of Justice is a requiem marking the death of privilege in corporate criminal investiga-
tions."); see also Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-
Client Privilege Under the McNulty Memorandum: Hearings Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
109th Cong. (2007), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2886 [hereinafter Mc-
Nulty Memo Hearing].
2. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
286 (1996) (indicating that 78% of suspects waive their Miranda rights).
3. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117 (1998).
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become inured to it. Some, like Judge Lynch, actually embrace it and
remind us that deviation from our touted adversarial ideal does not
necessarily make our system unreasonable or unjust.4
Part II of this Article sets out the dimensions of the current debate
over corporate privilege waivers-Justice Department policies since
1999, challenges to those policies, and the proposed legislative re-
sponse. 5 Part III teases out the legal and institutional strands of the
policy debate.6 The larger criminal procedure backdrop-waiver as
the normal way of doing business-presents special challenges to
those who would complain of government privilege-waiver demands
and to those who would assess, and perhaps address, those complaints.
That a potential criminal defendant is obliged to surrender a useful
right as the price of avoiding prosecution is not, in and of itself, partic-
ularly interesting or troubling, especially where that party has ade-
quate access to zealous and competent legal counsel-something too
many criminal defendants lack. What, if anything, about this particu-
lar waiver demand is problematic? While the literature is filled with
arguments by academics-who fear that the flickering of corporate
privileges presages a more general threat to attorney-client protec-
tions-and by able white-collar defense counsel-concerned with the
plight of their individual and corporate clients, as well as the indepen-
dence and esprit of their own profession-those arguments generally
rest on a number of quite contestable empirical and normative pro-
positions. Part III discusses these arguments and the assumptions that
lie behind them.
In the face of empirical or policy uncertainty, we often use doctrinal
tools to truncate or advance the analysis. However, as Part IV shows,
waiver is so enshrined in current doctrine that such tools are of limited
use for those dissatisfied or uneasy with government practices in this
area. 7 The general approach assigns broad rights to defendants and
extraordinarily coercive sanctioning powers to the government, then
ratifies the results of the ensuing bargaining process. White-collar
lawyers appear to recognize this as well, hence their unusual prolifi-
cacy and pleas for legislative intervention.
In the face of such lobbying, the question becomes one of institu-
tional choice-the second focus of Part IV.8 The current scheme-
4. Id.; see also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003).
5. See infra notes 10-38 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 39-93 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 112-144 and accompanying text.
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established by the December 2006 "McNulty Memo" 9-subjects
waiver demands to a degree of oversight, both from within a district
and from Washington, that may well moderate prosecutorial behavior.
Any effort to go further and establish a more stringent set of controls
or an outright prohibition ought not be made without thinking about
the effect that the locus of decision making has on Justice Department
decisions and about the dynamics of legislative oversight. Moreover,
consideration of the political economy of white-collar criminal en-
forcement counsels legislative-and perhaps even administrative-
forbearance.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Some facts are not in dispute. In 1999, Deputy Attorney General
Eric Holder issued a memorandum entitled "Federal Prosecution of
Corporations," now known as the "Holder Memo,"'1 which counseled
prosecutors to consider a number of factors when determining
whether to bring charges against a corporate target. Among these fac-
tors were the "corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrong-
doing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents,
including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and
work-product privileges."11
In early 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a
policy memorandum on "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Busi-
ness Organizations," which, while substantively identical on this point,
was mandatory in nature. 12 The "Thompson Memo" noted that any
9. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dept. Compo-
nents & U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollar-
crime-blog/files/mcnulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
10. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to all Component Heads
& U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/
privilegewaiver/1999junl6-privwaiv-dojholder.pdf [hereinafter Holder Memo]; see also Philip
Urofsky, Prosecuting Corporations: The Federal Principles and Corporate Compliance Pro-
grams, 50 U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULL. 19 (Mar. 2002).
11. Holder Memo, supra note 10, at 4. In October 2001, the SEC noted that it, too, would
consider a company's readiness to waive its privilege when assessing the extent of that com-
pany's cooperation with an investigation. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF INVESTI-
GATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE AT OF 1934 AND
COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
DECISIONS (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm;
see also McLucas et al., supra note 1, at 631. The focus here, however, will be on criminal
investigations and proceedings.
12. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, U.S. Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dept.
Components & U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/busi-
nessorganizations.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memo]; see also Christopher A. Wray & Robert
K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo In The-
ory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095 (2006).
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"waiver should ordinarily be limited to the factual internal investiga-
tion and any contemporaneous advice given to the corporation con-
cerning the conduct at issue. Except in unusual circumstances,
prosecutors should not seek a waiver with respect to communications
and work product related to advice concerning the government's crim-
inal investigation." 13
The consequences of that policy articulation are somewhat unclear.
In a late 2003 interview, then-U.S. Attorney and soon-to-be Deputy
Attorney General James Comey noted that a corporation's willingness
to waive its privilege was not a "litmus test" when it comes to charging
decisions and that he had seen no evidence that prosecutors routinely
demanded waivers. The Department simply "expect[ed] cooperating
corporations to help us catch the bad guys." He explained the
possibilities: 14
If a corporation can do that without a waiver, prosecutors should
give them the opportunity to do that. If the questions are fully an-
swered without a waiver, prosecutors should consider that to be
meaningful cooperation in evaluating all factors in making the
charging decision. If a corporation wishes to go farther and share
work product and privileged materials in order to enhance the Gov-
ernment's investigation, so much the better. Whether a corpora-
tion's failure to cooperate at all, or failure to waive if necessary to
answer those questions, will result in a charge, is a separate issue
that can only be answered by evaluating all the factors.' 5
In 2004, the Department's point person on the issue, Mary Beth
Buchanan, drew on a 2002 survey of all U.S. Attorneys' offices to re-
port that "requests for waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-
product protection were the exception rather than the rule."1 6 She
added that "those who argue that waivers are required frequently do
so on the basis of anecdotes without any supporting data.' 17
On October 21, 2005, the Department offered a sop to critics in the
form of a memorandum by Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert
D. McCallum, Jr., "the McCallum Memo."'18 The McCallum Memo
13. Thompson Memo, supra note 12, at 7 n.3.
14. Interview with U.S. Attorney James B. Comey Regarding Department of Justice's Policy on
Requesting Corporations under Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney Client Privilege and
Work Product Protection, 51 U.S. ATrORNEYS' BULL. 1, 1-2 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter Comey
Interview].
15. Id.
16. Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 598 (2004).
17. Id.
18. Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dept.
Components & U.S. Att'ys (Oct. 21, 2005). available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/
privilegewaiver/2005oct2 lprivwaiv dojmccallum.pdf.
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reaffirmed prior departmental policy, but added the following
mandate:
To ensure that federal prosecutors exercise appropriate
prosecutorial discretion under the principles of the Thompson
Memorandum, some United States Attorneys have established re-
view processes for waiver requests that require federal prosecutors
to obtain approval from the United States Attorney or other super-
visor before seeking a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or
work product protection. Consistent with this best practice, you are
directed to establish a written waiver review process for your dis-
trict or component.... Such waiver review processes may vary from
district to district (or component to component), so that each
United States Attorney or component head retains the
prosecutorial discretion necessary, consistent with circumstances, to
seek timely, complete, and accurate information from business
organizations.19
The McCallum Memo's chief significance was thus negative, as it im-
plicitly rejected both challenges to existing waiver practices and called
for greater centralized supervision of waiver demands.
Meanwhile, those on the other side of the already heated debate
tried to go beyond anecdote-albeit in surveys that, as Julie
O'Sullivan noted, "were not conducted with even minimal rigor."' 20 A
survey by the Association of Corporate Counsel of its members and-
through other organizations in the Coalition to Preserve the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege-of white-collar practitioners21 found widespread
belief among respondents that "a 'culture of waiver' has evolved in
which governmental agencies believe it is reasonable and appropriate
for them to expect a company under investigation to broadly waive
attorney-client privilege or work product protections. '2 2 Although
the survey inquired about all law enforcement agencies, respondents
made clear that U.S. Attorneys' offices were the most frequent of-
fenders.23 Of the respondents who had been investigated, "55% of
outside counsel responded that waiver of the attorney-client privilege
19. Id.
20. Julie O'Sullivan, Does the DOJ's Compelled-Voluntary Privilege Waiver Policy Undermine
Corporate Client's Willingness to Communicate with Counsel and Counsel's Ability to Ensure
Corporate Legal Compliance? A Preliminary "No," (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11, on file
with author).
21. ASS'N OF CORP. COUNSEL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
THE CORPORATE CONTEXT, 2-3 n.7 (2006), available at http://www.acc.com/resource/v6877
[hereinafter ACC SURVEY]. The survey received 676 responses from in-house counsel and 538
from outside counsel. Id.
22. Id. at 3; accord In re Qwest Comm'cns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1199-1201 (10th Cir.
2006) (noting amicus ACC's efforts to draw the court's attention to the "culture of waiver").
23. ACC SURVEY, supra note 21, at 6.
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[had been] requested by enforcement officials either directly or indi-
rectly, [and 27%] of in-house counsel confirmed this to be true. 24
What privileged or protected materials did prosecutors seek? In
November 2003, U.S. Attorney Comey described their waiver
requests:
[Pirosecutors are not generally seeking legal advice or opinion work
product; they are just seeking the facts, including factual attorney
work product. Of course, disclosure of interview notes or the facts
contained in the notes reflects the questions asked by the attorney,
which may result from prior research, as well as the attorney's focus
during the interview. The disclosure, however, involves a minimal
intrusion on the privilege. 25
The 2006 Corporate Counsel Survey largely corroborated this, but
also found that, for those respondents reporting the nature of materi-
als demanded, 15% of the requests to in-house counsel and 20% of
the requests to outside counsel had involved materials relating to the
advice of counsel. 26
The immediate audience for the Corporate Counsel Survey was the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, and the response from the Commission
must have been gratifying. In May 2006, the Commission amended
the Sentencing Guidelines to eliminate language that was "misinter-
preted to encourage waivers."'27 Given that the Guidelines speak only
to sentencing and not to the demands that the government makes as a
condition for allowing a company to avoid criminal liability, the signif-
icance of this advocacy victory has been limited, as it will continue to
be unless the Commission's decision influences Congress or the Jus-
tice Department.
More balm for critics came early in December 2006 when Senator
Arlen Specter, in his last months of chairing the Judiciary Committee,
introduced legislation that would bar the government from demand-
ing the waiver of an organizational attorney-client privilege and from
considering an entity's assertion of that privilege when deciding
24. Id. at 4.
25. Comey Interview, supra note 14, at 1.
26. ACC SURVEY, supra note 21, at 9. The Survey report regrettably lumped together situa-
tions in which defendants asserted an "advice-of-counsel" defense and those where they did not,
as well as cases in which defendants sought advice related "to the investigation itself (rather than
the underlying conduct being investigated)." Id.
27. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 45 (May 18,
2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/FinalUserFrdly.pdf (eliminating the last sen-
tence of Application Note 12 to § 8C2.5, which stated that "[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege
and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score ... unless
such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent
information known to the organization"). The amendment took effect on Nov. 1, 2006, in the
absence of congressional modification.
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whether to pursue criminal charges or civil sanctions.28 On December
12, 2006, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, during a speech to
the New York-based business and defense lawyer group, the Lawyers
for Civil Justice, announced a revision of the Thompson Memo.29
While not addressing the common scenario-in which a corporation
"volunteers" to waive its privilege-the McNulty Memo somewhat
tightened the internal regulations on prosecutors who explicitly ask
for the most frequently sought privileged materials: documents, inter-
view memoranda, and "reports containing investigative facts docu-
mented by counsel. '30
Before asking a corporation to waive its privilege on these "Cate-
gory I" materials, a line prosecutor must obtain written authorization
from the U.S. Attorney, who must in turn consult with the head of the
Criminal Division in Washington. 31 Prior to seeking waiver of privi-
lege as to "Category II" materials-those which reveal "legal advice
given to the corporation before, during, and after the underlying mis-
conduct"-prosecutors must obtain the Deputy Attorney General's
written permission.32 The McNulty Memo makes exceptions when the
material sought relates to the underlying misconduct and the corpora-
tion or one of its employees is relying on an advice-of-counsel defense
or when the advice falls within the crime/fraud exception to the privi-
lege. Prosecutors may consider a corporation's response to a Cate-
gory I request when deciding whether a firm has cooperated, but they
cannot consider a firm's refusal to waive the privilege on Category II
materials.
Although its promulgator billed it as such, it is far from clear that
the McNulty Memo constitutes a significant departure from existing
practice. It does, however, signal a tactical retreat by the Department
and perhaps the beginning of a new quietism toward corporate crime.
Some influential interests would applaud the latter. Just nine days
before the Memo's release, the Committee on Capital Markets Regu-
28. 152 CONG. REC. S11438-39 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter). The bill
was reintroduced as the Attorney-Client Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007). For
a critique of Senator Specter's bill, see McNulty Memo Hearing, supra note 1, Written Testimony
of Daniel Richman, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2886&wit-id=6656.
29. Lawyers for Civil Justice, http://www.lfcj.com/process.cfmPagelD=2 (last visited Sept. 24,
2007). According to its website, Lawyers for Civil Justice "plays a unique role in the civil justice
reform movement by coalescing the resources of the defense trial lawyers with the support of a
significant segment of the business community." Id.
30. McNulty Memo, supra note 9.
31. Id.
32. Id.
20081
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lation, formed with the support of the Secretary of the Treasury, 33 re-
leased its "interim" report, which recommended that the Justice
Department "revise its.., guidelines so that firms are only prosecuted
in exceptional circumstances of pervasive culpability throughout all
offices and ranks. '34 The Committee also recommended that the De-
partment "revise its prosecutorial guidelines to prohibit federal prose-
cutors from seeking waivers of the attorney-client privilege. 35
Others, too, have argued that the pendulum has swung too far in the
direction of enforcement as a result of overreaction to Enron and
other corporate scandals. 36
At a September 2007 hearing on Senator Specter's bill, a Justice
Department representative reported that, "[s]ince December 2006,
the Criminal Division has received ten requests for factual informa-
tion under Category I of the McNulty Memorandum, only five of
which involved a request for privileged documents actually covered by
the Memorandum. Four of those five requests were approved. '37
Moreover, the Deputy Attorney General's office had "not processed
any requests for attorney-client communications under Category II of
the Memorandum. '38
III. THE POLICY DEBATE AND ITS UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
What exactly is at stake here, beyond the obvious point that the
government is using its considerable leverage to extract waivers of val-
uable rights from corporate entities, which recognize that the mere
decision to charge can put them out of business? The available data
are rather thin. Although the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Cli-
ent Privilege purportedly sought to document the extent to which a
"culture of waiver" prevails among government enforcers, its survey
results give only a sketch of the alleged problem. Respondents in the
study offered some telling quotes, but were not necessarily represen-
tative of practitioners in the area or even of the entire membership of
33. See Jenny Anderson, Sharply Divided Reactions to Report on U.S. Markets, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2006, at C8.
34. INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 85 (Nov. 30,
2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterim-ReportREV2.pdf.
35. Id. at 86 (emphasis in original). The report, like the McNulty Memo, also addressed the
degree to which a prosecutor's charging calculus can include a corporation's advancement of
legal fees to its employees. See United States v. Stein (KPMG Case), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), appeal pending. This Article does not address that issue.
36. See Carrie Johnson, SEC Shift May Lead to Lower Penalty: Policy Addresses Firms' Cul-
pability, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2007, at Dl.
37. McNulty Memo Hearing, supra note 1, Statement of Karin Immergut, U.S. Att'y., D. Ore.,
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=2886&witid=6653.
38. Id.
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the organizations involved. 39 Moreover, without raw data, it is diffi-
cult to discern the degree to which those responses reflected general
perceptions rather than personal experiences. As noted above, it is
unclear to what extent prosecutors have sought access to materials
relating to counsel's advice in situations other than those in which a
target has asserted an advice-of-counsel defense.
For its part, the Justice Department has only just started to provide
a more complete picture of how its representatives have conducted
themselves. To be fair, collecting data of this sort has always been a
challenge for the Department, particularly when information requests
are not accompanied by a regime of strict, centralized control.40 Even
if Main Justice received complete and detailed field reports about ne-
gotiations with corporate counsel, issues would remain regarding sig-
nals received by counsel, but not intentionally or explicitly sent by
prosecutors. 41 Prosecutors can make clear demands, but they can also
make casual suggestions or choose to say nothing, thereby profiting
from defense counsel misperceptions of government expectations. Ef-
forts have indeed been made to collect data in the wake of the Mc-
Nulty Memo, but considerable uncertainty remains.42
Pending the kind of data that the McNulty Memo may produce,
assume that privilege waiver is regularly on the table when a corpora-
tion seeks to avoid prosecution by demonstrating "cooperation." As-
sume further that the waivers sought or obtained encompass all
factual materials gathered by inside or outside counsel as part of their
internal investigation into matters of government concern. This would
include written reports prepared by counsel (though reports are often
oral) and the underlying interview notes and memos, which, like the
reports themselves, would otherwise be protected against disclosure
by a combination of attorney-client and work-product privileges.
39. ACC SURVEY, supra note 21, at 2-3 n.7 ("We believe the survey's response rate can be
considered robust; but since we are not an independent surveying company or statisticians, we
can make no proffer that the sampling is statistically significant or representative of the entire
profession.").
40. The strenuous effort that the Justice Department has made in capital cases provides a
remarkable, though understandable, contrast to its efforts in noncapital cases. See John Gleeson,
Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S.
Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697 (2003); Daniel Richman,
Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2068 (2006); see also
Stephen P. Klein et al., Race and the Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Federal Cases (2006),
available at http://rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2006/RANDTR389.pdf.
41. See Wray & Hur, supra note 12, at 1177 ("Mutual misunderstandings between [prosecu-
tion and defense attorneys] can help explain the chasm between the Justice Department's ac-
counts of the rarity of waiver requests and the defense bar's vehement insistence that they occur
routinely.").
42. See McNulty Memo Hearing, supra note 1, Statement of Karin Immergut.
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A solid case can be made for a regime of broad disclosure by corpo-
rations-coerced, prodded, encouraged, or simply appreciated by the
government. Although corporations have no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, 43 the collective knowledge of these ar-
tificial "persons" often cannot be tapped without the participation of
corporate counsel. The government subjects natural persons to inten-
sive debriefings as a condition of cooperation to ensure that they fully
disclose what they know about matters under investigation. The only
way a corporation can render an analogous degree of cooperation is
through the disclosure of all factual materials in its control, including,
in particular, information gathered by its lawyers. As is always the
case when the government uses the explicit or implicit threat of prose-
cution to obtain information, the subject of the pressure would prefer
it otherwise. But, given the alternatives-possible prosecution or per-
haps a sustained grand jury investigation-this coercion seems little
different from the sort generally tolerated in the criminal justice
system.
44
Why, then, should the government's coercive efforts to obtain these
materials cause such concern? These efforts put firms at a disadvan-
tage, but what are the social costs? There are forceful arguments
against such practices that will only be sketched out here, with the
goal merely to expose their underlying empirical or normative as-
sumptions. First, Section A looks at the plight of firms, then of the
officers and employees within them. Finally, Section B turns to
broader systemic concerns.
A. The Plight of Firms
The first category of criticism looks to the plight of corporations in a
world in which their internal investigations or inquiries may end up
43. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906):
O'Sullivan, supra note 20, at 22 ("[B]ecause it lacks a Fifth Amendment privilege, a corporation
can protect the results of its investigation-at least until it chooses how it will act on the report-
only by using lawyers who can shield their work under the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine.").
44. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (holding that the prosecutor's
offer to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge, as opposed to a charge carrying a life sentence,
simply presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing
charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17. 31
(1973) ("Although every [plea bargain] has a discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of
his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable attribute of any legiti-
mate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas."); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (declining to find that guilty pleas are invalid "whenever motivated by
the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a
wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty author-
ized by law for the crime charged"); United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 366, 374 (2d Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 57:295
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being transparent to the government. Should this prospect lead firms
to engage in fewer internal investigations, the social cost of a waiver
regime would be grave indeed. However, this seems unlikely.45 Cor-
porate managers already have considerable legal and economic incen-
tives "to strive for legal compliance irrespective of the prospect of
privilege waiver. '46 The costs of failing to inquire into questionable
conduct can be great, and the government may not even take an inter-
est in the matter. Moreover, should existing incentives be insufficient
in this regard, policymakers could increase them, particularly on the
civil or criminal sanctioning side.47
Perhaps firms will continue to request internal inquiries, but their
lawyers would be less zealous and effective in conducting them. Yet,
as Professor O'Sullivan keenly observed, defense counsel's argument
that "their duty of effective representation requires them to compro-
mise the investigation" sounds very much "like an argument that a
lawyer's ethical duty to the entity requires-in light of the possibility
of prospective privilege waiver requests-that lawyers commit mal-
practice while investigating. '48 O'Sullivan is aptly skeptical of this
argument.
A more subtle chilling-effect argument considers counsel's own in-
terests. Even assuming that a clear distinction can be drawn between
factual material and legal advice, and that only the former will be rou-
tinely disclosed to the government, counsel may still be reluctant to
create materials that will be subject to prosecutorial scrutiny-scru-
tiny that might extend to the lawyers themselves. 49 At worst, the law-
yers risk obstruction charges. At best, they are rendered potential
45. But see Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Proce-
dure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311 (2007). Griffin suggests that, as a result of government waiver
demands, "some corporations [already] have limited internal investigations to pare down the
amount of potential misconduct and proprietary information that must be revealed to the gov-
ernment." Id. at 345-46. The Business Week article that she cites for support, however, offers
little clear evidence. See Lorraine Woellert, Justice Softens Investigation Guidelines, BUSINESS-
WEEK.cOM, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/dec2006/
db20061213_615165.htm. In all fairness, clear empirical data would be difficult to find.
46. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response
to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 903 (2006); accord Comey
Interview, supra note 14, at 2 ("We have seen no evidence at all that corporations refrain from
conducting internal investigations because, in order to obtain leniency for cooperating, they
might be asked to waive a privilege.").
47. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968).
48. O'Sullivan, supra note 20, at 48.
49. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (discussing why it is unwise to deter
lawyers from keeping written records).
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government witnesses. 50 Yet the power of this argument is debatable.
After all, prosecutors regularly become potential witnesses. Although
prosecutors generally do not have to worry about obstruction charges,
it is unclear that corporate defense counsel really need worry either-
particularly if they avoid doing interviews on their own.
Ironically, another argument is, in part, driven by the assumption
that potential civil sanctions are already too great-at least those im-
posed at the behest of private plaintiffs. Corporations will continue to
conduct internal investigations, and they will comply with
prosecutorial waiver demands. Unfortunately, these corporations will
face disclosure of sensitive materials not only to the government, but
also to private plaintiffs. Outside of the Eighth Circuit, and in the
absence of congressional action, there is no clear doctrine of "selective
waiver" of the sort that would allow a corporation to assert its privi-
leges against other plaintiffs after disclosing otherwise privileged
materials to the government.51 At first blush, this scenario does not
appear troubling. After all, why be concerned if litigation costs to de-
serving plaintiffs are reduced? Private plaintiffs are often permitted
to piggyback off criminal convictions with offensive collateral estop-
pel.52 Why not let them similarly take advantage of the government's
entire investigative haul? Indeed, one could argue that "private liti-
gants have no less of an interest [than the government] and may be
better suited to achieving the goals of deterrence and punishment of
corporations. 53
On the other hand, the introduction of private litigants into the mix
may be more problematic, because not all plaintiffs are equally "de-
serving. ' '54 The internal investigation that either clears the firm or
provides evidence of misconduct so equivocal as to be unworthy of
prosecutorial pursuit might still provide grist for one or more civil
suits that, though not meritorious, still need to be settled or litigated. 55
Effectively subsidizing these suits through a privilege waiver regime
could lead to overdeterrence. Alternatively, a firm otherwise ready to
50. Thanks to Julie O'Sullivan for this point.
51. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006).
52. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 221-22 (1983).
53. Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver:
Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 155, 189-90 (2006).
54. Indeed, the ability of shareholders to diversify, among other things, raises questions about
all securities class actions. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An
Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1547 (2006).
55. See Coffee Jr., supra note 52; see also Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the
Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1997).
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fully cooperate with any government investigation might think twice
about cooperating when such subsidization is the consequence. 56
There is also the risk that a waiver regime would result in less pro-
ductive investigations, because officers and employees worry about
providing statements that will thereafter be turned over to the govern-
ment. This risk might be quite limited, however, because officers and
employees would have these concerns even without prosecutorial
waiver demands.57 The privilege belongs to the corporation, and the
corporate calculus could easily dictate giving the government informa-
tion that exposes its officers and employees to criminal liability, even
in the absence of a government demanded waiver. 58 The possibility
that a corporation will "push liability downward" onto individual of-
ficers or employees is a standard problem in white-collar enforce-
ment.59 Perhaps there are officers or employees who would be
forthcoming under a robust privilege regime, notwithstanding the cor-
poration's control over the privilege, because they trust the firm to
consider their personal interests and do not think it would lightly turn
them in-perhaps because they have real power within the firm. One
would expect these individuals to be less open with internal investiga-
tors under a waiver regime that increases the likelihood of govern-
ment access to their statements. However, the size of this class is
unclear.
One can step back from concerns relating to employee trust of in-
ternal investigators to concerns about employee trust more gener-
56. See George J. Terwilliger III & Darryl S. Lew, Privilege in Peril: Corporate Cooperation in
the New Era of Government Investigations, 7 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y'S PRACTICE
GROUPS 25, 30 (Mar. 2006) ("The uncertainty regarding principles of limited waiver also can
dampen corporations' enthusiasm for cooperating with government investigations.").
57. See William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities
of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1468 (2006) ("Given [the] long-standing
limits on the privilege, it has always been irrational for a manager to make disclosures to the
corporation's counsel that she would not have been willing to make ih the absence of any confi-
dentiality safeguards.").
58. See Brown, Jr., supra note 46, at 904 ("Corporate constituents ... could legitimately dis-
trust the security provided to them by the corporate privilege, given that it belongs to the corpo-
ration rather than to them individually."); see also Buchanan, supra note 16, at 599-600; John E.
Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 443, 509 (1982) (noting that, when "the information-holder has a personal, as well as corpo-
rate, legal interest in the information he possesses, the possibility that the corporation might
waive the attorney-client privilege, thereby rendering the information discoverable, would create
a powerful incentive either to refuse to communicate with the attorney or to prevaricate").
59. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (1999).
2008]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ally. 60 The mutual distrust that government cooperation incentives
breed among co-conspirators is often celebrated. 6' That is the beauty
of the Prisoner's Dilemma, at least from a societal perspective-pris-
oners as a class are likely less keen on the phenomenon. Within cor-
porations, however, trust is something society generally wants to
foster. 62 When corporations "own" the information they obtain in the
course of internal probes, they can fairly be expected to consider the
costs of "betraying" the loyalty of the employee who is forthright with
internal investigators. In a waiver regime, firms lose the ability to
make and act on such calculations, as effective "ownership" of the
investigative haul is transferred to the government. The resulting
costs in internal cohesiveness may thus be greater than those flowing
simply from corporate control of the privilege.
There is, however, a rejoinder to the trust argument: the extent to
which trust drives corporate productivity is far from clear.63 Moreo-
ver, given that waivers only occur after law enforcers become inter-
ested in a matter, the extent to which a waiver regime threatens any
such trust is also unclear. After all, many firms will conduct internal
investigations in matters that never appear on any prosecutorial radar.
Even were a waiver regime to erode such trust, the social cost of that
erosion might be counterbalanced by the social gains from cheaper
and more effective law enforcement.
Corporations might even share the benefits of more efficient law
enforcement. Although a savvy federal enforcer will not stay within
the four corners of internal investigation reports or interview memos,
these legal products can significantly speed the process of getting to
the bottom of the matter at hand. The enforcer who reaches the bot-
tom, or thinks she has, will often be satisfied and move on to other
60. See Zornow & Krakauer, supra note 1, at 156 (noting that a waiver demand "has the effect
of chilling the inquiry from the outset and often has an adverse impact on the relationships
among senior management and lower-level employees").
61. See Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing
Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670 (1992); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating
Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT'G
REP. 292 (1996): Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1995).
62. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foun-
dations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1757-59 (2001); Griffin, supra note 45, at
335 (noting that waiver demands undercut loyalty within firms).
63. See CHARLES HECKSCHER, WHITE-COLLAR BLUES: MANAGEMENT LOYALTIES IN AN
AGE OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING (1995); PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE
AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: How IT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (1999);
BROKEN LADDERS: MANAGERIAL CAREERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY (Paul Osterman ed., 1996).
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cases. The sooner the government searchlight is extinguished, the bet-
ter for the firm. 64
This shared benefits argument might strike a corporate defender as
rather paternalistic. Sure, handing internal investigative materials
over to the government on a silver platter might serve shareholder
interests. Even without a prosecutorial regime that explicitly en-
couraged waiver, a firm seeking to signal that it has nothing to hide
would be tempted to pursue an "open file" policy with the govern-
ment. Yet this hardly means that disclosure is invariably in sharehold-
ers' interests. Corporate counsel ought to be left to figure this out for
herself, especially in light of the civil plaintiffs who might be waiting in
the wings.
But there is a counterclaim to the cry of paternalism: perhaps man-
agement is not the greatest judge of shareholders' best interests in
these matters.65 Management might be prone to overvalue the impor-
tance of trust within the firm. Managers themselves might have some
actual or perceived culpability in the corporate conduct being investi-
gated. Alternatively, having altogether different skeletons in their
own closets, managers might confuse their personal interest in the
non-disclosure of internal corporate matters with shareholders' inter-
ests. The extent to which managers' interests are aligned with share-
holders' interests on this score will vary considerably with the type of
misconduct under scrutiny, with a long continuum running from cases
of isolated self-dealing by an individual employee to cases of sustained
bid-rigging (or violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) that
primarily benefits the firm. Even if one assumes as a general matter
that, regardless of endemic agency problems,66 corporate managers
are better situated than the government to advance shareholder inter-
ests, one might still wonder if this assumption holds true where the
government has found reason to criminally investigate corporate
conduct.
64. See Buchanan, supra note 16, at 605. "The corporation may be able to identify quickly
and efficiently the appropriate individuals with knowledge of the events and the relevant docu-
ments and other evidence. This is what makes the investigation of corporate crimes unique and
why the corporation may be in a position to benefit itself by cooperating .... Id.; see also
Fordham U. Sch. of Law, Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Proposal 502, at
59, (Apr. 24, 2006) (statement of Peter Pope, Deputy Att'y Gen., N.Y.) (noting the interest of
corporations to quickly dispose of matters).
65. See William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?: An
Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2003).
66. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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The challenge to the suitability of managers as guardians of the cor-
porate privilege, at least where government investigations are con-
cerned, may prove too much. If law enforcers are indeed better
placed than managers to determine when the privilege ought to be
waived, why have the privilege to begin with? This is a fair question,
one to which this Article will return. But, for now, the challenge
should be seen as supporting, at a minimum, a "coerced" waiver
regime.
B. Plight of Officers and Employees
A second category of arguments against a coerced waiver regime
evinces solicitude less for corporate entities than for their individual
officers and employees. That these arguments are made by corpora-
tions or those that represent them is interesting, but hardly disposi-
tive, because, as previously noted, firms have their own interest in
assuring fairness to their officers and employees.
Internal investigations can put an executive or employee into a dif-
ficult position, to put it mildly. Should she refuse to speak, she may
well lose her job. 67 She also faces the risk that, should she speak, her
statements will be turned over to the government and expose her to
civil or criminal liability. As noted, this risk would be present even if
the government eschewed privilege waiver demands, because waiver
may serve the firm's own interests, and because the waiver decision is
the firm's to make. 68 Should she lie, she might find herself charged
with obstruction of justice. 69
If an executive or employee expects that statements to corporate
counsel are protected by an attorney-client privilege that she controls,
she will likely be corrected by counsel, who ought to give her "Upjohn
warnings."'70 Should counsel fail to give these warnings and should
the employee reasonably conclude that counsel represents her and not
the firm, a court might find that an attorney-client relationship exists
and she does control the privilege. 7l Thus, companies that wish to
maintain control over such statements have some incentive to clarify
counsel's role, and there is some reason to believe that Upjohn warn-
67. McLucas et al., supra note 1, at 636-37 n.62; see also Griffin, supra note 45; Comey Inter-
view, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that a corporation has the ability to require an employee to
cooperate with its counsel on pain of dismissal).
68. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
69. See McLucas et al., supra note 1, at 637 n.63 (discussing Computer Associates charges in
Federal District Court in the Eastern District of New York); O'Sullivan, supra note 20, at 60.
70. See Brown, supra note 46, at 939; O'Sullivan, supra note 20, at 57.
71. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2005); see also
O'Sullivan, supra note 20, at 59-60.
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ings have become standard procedure. 72 If employers infrequently or
inadequately give such warnings and courts cannot be counted on to
give relief to the misled employee-say, by giving her control over the
privilege and protection against the derivative use of statements ob-
tained in violation of the privilege 73-any regime that envisions cor-
porate waivers, whether purely strategic or coerced, is indeed
problematic. The most obvious solution, however, is to ensure that
corporations bolster their Upjohn warning practices.
C. Broader Systemic Concerns
Other arguments against a coerced waiver regime go beyond con-
cern for corporations and their employees per se and look to broader
systemic damage that may result from such a regime. First, some see
the corporate privilege as a miner's canary.74 If the government is
permitted to eviscerate the attorney-client privilege of corporations, it
may next turn to other kinds of defendants. 75 Such slippery-slope ar-
guments are easily made and hard to answer. 76 However, some gov-
ernment actions, like the prosecution of Lynne Stewart, seem quite
unconnected to the coerced waiver trend, and there is little reason to
expect that privilege waiver will be a non-negotiable part of coopera-
tion for noncooperative clients. 77
Why does the government refrain from demanding that individuals
waive their attorney-client privilege as a down payment on the coop-
eration that defendants so fervently seek to render? 78 After all, the
72. See Paul Rothstein, The Story of Upjohn Co. v. United States: One Man's Journey to
Extend Lawyer-Client Confidentiality, and the Social Forces That Affected It, in EVIDENCE STO-
RIES 151, 176 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006) (noting that, "[iun view of the frequency of waiver
today," employees ordinarily know about "the waiver incentives operating on the company").
73. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 04-124-03 and 04-124-05, 454 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the Kastigar standard
applies where attorney-client privilege is breached).
74. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RE-
SISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2003) (recounting how miners used to bring
along canaries, because the bird's "more fragile respiratory system would cause it to collapse
from noxious gases long before humans were affected").
75. See Cole, supra note 1; see also Peter J. Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 669, 674 (2005) (asserting that the Justice Department's positions in corporate prosecutions
are "symptomatic" of the Department's "broader push against lawyers").
76. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026
(2003).
77. The cooperation agreement of Michael J. Kopper and the Enron Task Force did contain
such a waiver provision. See JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1302 (2d ed. 2003). This, however, appears to be the exception that proves the
rule.
78. In 2006, the national rate for sentences "below guidelines range" because of defendants'
substantial assistance was 14.4%, with districts ranging from 0.9% to 40.0%. U.S. SENTENCING
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government demands that defendants seeking a cooperation agree-
ment waive the protections of the rules that ordinarily bar the use of
statements made in the course of plea negotiations. 79 Why not use the
enormous bargaining leverage that enures from substantial control
over cooperators' sentencing discounts8 ° to obtain information from a
prospective cooperator's lawyer that might help a prosecutor assess
the defendant's credibility? One reason this practice has not devel-
oped may be that the perceived benefits are small and the risks are
great. The government presumes that it will get the client's complete
account during the proffer sessions that precede entry into a coopera-
tion agreement or during the debriefing sessions that follow.8' Addi-
tionally, the Brady issues that would arise from treating counsel as a
supplemental source of information could create more headaches than
the effort is worth. If the government has unfettered access to defense
counsel files, all "material" information in them might be subject to
disclosure in future trials of other defendants.82 In short, the govern-
ment's protection of the space between attorney and cooperator often
benefits prosecutors as much as it benefits cooperators.
Another reason for the government's forbearance might simply be
the respect that prosecutors-who, after all, have much in common
with, and will probably soon be, defense lawyers-have for the privi-
lege.8 3 At any rate, waivers are not demanded as part of an individ-
ual's cooperation, and there is no reason to expect that a prosecutorial
practice peculiar to the corporate context-where corporate counsel is
the repository of information and evidence that cannot easily be du-
plicated by prosecutors-will be extended outside of it.
COMMISSION, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2007), http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/
chap5_06.pdf. This does not include defendants who sought to cooperate but did not receive
5K.1 treatment, or safety valve defendants. The defendants receiving 5K.1 treatment obtained a
47.8% median decrease in the otherwise applicable guideline minimum sentence. Id. at 48.
79. See Benjamin A. Naftalis, "Queen for a Day" Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permis-
sible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (2003).
80. Prosecutors' control over 5K.1 may have been lessened by United States v. Fernandez, 443
F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006), which allowed a sentencing judge to consider a defendant's cooperation
even in the absence of a 5K.1 motion by the government.
81. But see Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999) (suggesting that prosecutors are not
very good at assessing cooperator credibility).
82. See United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 303-06 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing whether con-
structive knowledge of materials in state files could be imputed to the federal prosecution be-
cause of close involvement between the federal prosecution and state agents).
83. See Richman, supra note 4, at 787-88 (noting that "a great many" prosecutors see their
"job as a way station, a means of acquiring human capital ... that will facilitate their representa-
tion of private clients thereafter").
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Indeed, the burdens that waiver demands place on corporate coun-
sel grow out of the special relationship between corporate counsel and
corporate "knowledge." When an individual seeks to cooperate with
the government, the government expects her to tell all she knows
about the investigated transactions and many peripheral matters, such
as unrelated personal misconduct, with grave consequences often at-
tending her failure to be completely forthcoming. If one expects anal-
ogous disclosure from artificial entities like corporations, to whom will
one turn if not the lawyers, who may well be the only corporate agents
charged with gathering all the information within the entity's collec-
tive knowledge?
Yet, even if a coerced waiver regime is confined to corporate cli-
ents, the threat it poses to the adversary system should not be dis-
counted-not through the erosion of the privilege itself, but through
the change it may bring to white-collar defense practice. While some
defense lawyers confine their practice to individual clients, corporate
clients loom large as actual or potential sources of business in this
segment of the profession. Should corporate counsel actually start
thinking of themselves "as an arm of law enforcement," 84 from
whence will come the adversarial mindset that we rely on to ensure
that the government does not overreach? Even in a world with in-
creasingly fewer trials, our readiness to rely on administrative and
professional prosecutorial controls has its limits. We want defense
counsel to be able to pose a credible threat of trial in appropriate
cases.
8 5
The last argument is particularly strong if we assume that white-
collar practice before waiver demands became common represented
some optimal level of adversarial zeal. That is contestable, of course.
Perhaps the government was unduly hampered by the information
control tactics that Kenneth Mann depicted so well in his study of
white-collar lawyers. 86 Given that large-scale corporate crime cases
have been a regular part of the prosecutorial diet for only three de-
cades at most,8 7 figuring out a baseline for balance-of-power calcula-
tions is difficult indeed. Moreover, the selection of such a baseline
84. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 147; see also Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investiga-
tions: Consequences of the Federal Deputization of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111
(2003).
85. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 2144 (noting that "the regular if proportionately infrequent
resort to the adversarial trial procedure" helps "keep at least a loose rein on executive power").
86. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS
AT WORK (1985).
87. See Tony G. Poveda, White-Collar Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionaliza-
tion of a Concept, 17 CRIM. L. & Soc. CHANGE 235 (1992).
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will inevitably be influenced by one's normative views on
prosecutorial priorities. One might find it perfectly acceptable to raise
the costs of white-collar prosecutions, because too many white-collar
cases overreach and chill viable commercial conduct,8 8 or because the
federal government has misallocated resources (perhaps toward vio-
lent crime or drug enforcement or, if one looks to the budget as a
whole, farm subsidies).
Insightful critics of a waiver regime have made another argument:
[A waiver regime] leverages governmental resources and takes
away the historical checks and balances that existed in the process
when the government investigated and company counsel defended
in such an investigation. When private attorneys can effectively be
commissioned into government service through a process that will
unearth every relevant scrap of relevant information at the com-
pany's cost, governmental budget constraints matter much less.
There is no incentive to hold back on some investigations that
would otherwise be unproductive, and the government has nearly
unlimited opportunity-with a low threshold for cost effective-
ness-to find misconduct at a public corporation. Because the pub-
licity and risks of a civil or criminal trial can be so devastating to
public corporations, and especially to highly regulated corpora-
tions-both in economic and reputational terms-they are often
compelled to settle, even if it means taking positions contrary to
their officers and employees.8 9
One can accept most of this analysis and still come out exactly the
other way if one believes that corporate criminal enforcement is so far
from the margin that a systematic reduction of the costs of prosecu-
tion should be celebrated, not feared. Even as corporate criminal en-
forcement continues to attract public attention, the recentering of the
federal enforcement bureaucracy since 9/11 has put enormous strains
on resource commitments outside the area of terrorism. Whether cor-
porate enforcement has been unaffected remains unclear. 90 Given
88. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overeriminal-
ization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997); see also Hen-
ning, supra note 75; Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703
(2005); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879 (2005).
89. McLucas et al., supra note 1, at 639.
90. Compare Daphne Eviatar, What's Behind the Drop in Corporate Fraud Indictments?, AM.
LAWYER, Nov. 1, 2007 (reporting "the precipitous decline in the number of major corporate
fraud indictments in the two years since the re-election of President Bush"), and Jason McLure,
Has the Wave of White-Collar Prosecutions Crested?, LEGAL TIMES, July 18, 2006 ("[B]y some
measures the crackdown on corporate criminals has stalled."), and Kelly Thornton & Onell R.
Soto, Job Performance Said to Be Behind White House Firing, S.D. UNION-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2007
(suggesting that the San Diego U.S. Attorney was asked to resign because of her focus on white-
collar and public corruption cases at the expense of immigration and gun cases), and Paul
Shukovsky & Daniel Lathrop, FBI Faces Deep Cuts in Programs to Fight Crime, SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 28, 2007, at Al (retired "top FBI official" observing that proposed 2008
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that even a waiver regime will not bring the marginal cost of investi-
gating and prosecuting a case down to zero-or anywhere close to
it91-it is entirely possible that "commissioning" corporate counsel as
deputies in the government's corporate crime program will be socially
beneficial. 92
Yet one needs to be careful in assessing the overall "social benefit"
in this area, even if one believes that there ought to be more corporate
crime prosecutions and that a waiver regime will further that goal. To
the extent that the regime skews enforcement activity and disposi-
tions, one might have additional concerns. One commentator sug-
gested, for instance, that "publicly traded companies are especially
susceptible to government demands for waiver in a way that private
companies are not," because "[a] private company simply does not
face the punishment that publicity and controversy can inflict at the
first sign of market concern. '93 If this is true, we would have to con-
sider the extent to which an enforcement skew toward publicly traded
companies is justified by the peculiar agency problems endemic to
broad-based ownership.
If the reader has a firm understanding of the social utility of a
waiver regime or the lack thereof by this point, it is probably because
she had some deeply held empirical and normative beliefs when she
started. This Article's goal has been not to persuade, but rather to
explore how positions on waiver have turned more on contestable as-
sumptions than on reasoning. One therefore yearns for the comfort of
budget cuts "will completely wipe out the FBI's white-collar program"), with U.S. DEP'T JuS-
TICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT Div., THE EXTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S REPRIORITIZATION EFFORTS, AUDIT REPORT 05-37, at 53 (Sept.
2005). "The FBI has, in recent years, designated corporate fraud as its top national priority for
financial crimes." Id. Additionally, "[c]ase management data from the [U.S. attorneys' offices]
also demonstrated the FBI's increased emphasis on corporate fraud matters, showing that the
FBI had referred more matters to [those offices] during [fiscal year] 2004 than it had during
[fiscal year] 2000." Id.
91. See Henning, supra note 75, at 696 (noting that "it is unlikely that the government will
accept the conclusions of an internal investigation uncritically or forego its own investigation
simply because the corporation's lawyers have already conducted one").
92. See Wray & Hur, supra note 12.
It makes complete sense for regulators and law enforcement officials to create incen-
tives for companies to cooperate with government investigations. Government re-
sources are finite; because it benefits investigators enormously when a company's often
formidable resources work with the government instead of against it, prosecutors and
regulators will continue to press companies to cooperate. To do otherwise would be
both inefficient and ineffective. And the increasing number of investigations that pro-
ceed at a dramatically quicker pace-the government's success in what it has dubbed
"real-time enforcement"-stems directly from the increase in corporate cooperation.
Id. at 1170-71.
93. McLucas et al., supra note 1, at 640.
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settled legal principles. But, unless one has no qualms at all about
waiver demands, doctrinal analysis is largely unhelpful. Indeed, its in-
determinancy offers a case study in the clash and interrelationship of
substantive and procedural law.
IV. DOCTRINAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTIONS
A. The Limits of Legal Doctrine
Critics of the waiver regime often point to the firmly rooted nature
and general social utility of the attorney-client privilege for both indi-
viduals and organizations. 94 Yet one gets little legal traction by noting
the entrenched status of a right or privilege in the criminal process.
Although there must be some limits on what rights can be vaived,95
the general rule is to presume waivability. 96 Moreover, although
many have called for some calibration of the bargaining pressure that
the government uses to extract such waivers, the general rule is to
deem "uncoerced" any waiver the government extracts by threatening
charges that it is "entitled" to bring under substantive law.97
Sure, it is curious that, in an area of ostensibly clear public inter-
est-the criminal process-we have opted for what is essentially a pri-
vate law regime of free bargaining-one that allots procedural rights
to citizens and organizations, grants substantive penal law "entitle-
ments" to the government,98 and accepts the arrangements that
emerge. But this is the state of current legal doctrine. Those seeking
94. See McLucas et al., supra note 1, at 629; McNulty Memo Hearing, supra note 1. Written
Testimony of Dick Thornburgh, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=
2886&witid=6654.
95. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) ("There may be some eviden-
tiary provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may
never be waived without irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts."' (quoting 21 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at
207-08 (1977))) see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (upholding refusal of trial
judge to accept defendant's waiver of his right to conflict-free representation).
96. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204: United States v. Fariduddin, 469 F.3d 1111, 1112 (7th Cir.
2006) ("Like almost all rights in the criminal process, the entitlement to a schedule of payments
may be waived." (citation omitted)).
97. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 208; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United
States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (noting that leverage came from the threat of the death
penalty, which was held unconstitutional in a subsequent case), William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher
v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STO-
RIES 351 (Carol Steiker ed., 2006): Stephanos Bibas. Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
98. "Entitlement" terms are rarely used in reference to the government's control over charg-
ing and perhaps sentencing. But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 501 (2000) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (discussing the "punishment to which the prosecution is by law entitled for a
given set of facts").
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rhetorical leverage from existing procedural law therefore must con-
front the breadth and prosecutorial authority afforded by existing sub-
stantive criminal law, which effectively allows a corporation to be held
criminally liable for any act committed by an employee in the course
of his employment that was intended to benefit the corporation.99
Professor Stuntz has insightfully highlighted the interrelationship of
substantive and procedural criminal law. 00 Legislative breadth inevi-
tably weakens procedural protections, often intentionally. Robustly
defined constitutional and subconstitutional protections can end up
being just chits in the bargaining process, to which defendants must
resort to avoid extraordinarily harsh punishment. Yet recognition of
the interrelationship between substantive and procedural law does not
necessarily come with a normative cash-out, particularly where
neither side of the legal divide is constitutionally based or even the
product of considered legislative action. This is precisely the case for
both corporate criminal liability and the corporate attorney-client
privilege under federal law, which both owe their existence and con-
tours far more to judicial fiat than legislative choice.
Corporate criminal liability is mostly a matter of federal common
law: in the absence of any express provision for entity liability, courts
have read it into criminal statutes and based it on respondeat superior.
Criticism of the consequent breadth of corporate criminal liability,
and of Congress's acquiescence to it, has been cogent and sustained.'10
The best justification for substantive respondeat superior criminal lia-
bility may be procedural: corporate criminal liability is essentially an
information-forcing penalty default that ensures that a corporation
will fully cooperate with prosecutors in the investigation of individual
99. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909): United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., "No
Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a
Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 668 (2006)
("[Gliven the way that courts have applied these principles, it is difficult to find a case in which a
corporation cannot be tagged for the activities of its agents.").
100. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Crimi-
nal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
101. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Criminal Liability,
75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L.
REV. 853, 876-79 (2007); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulat-
ing Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979); O'Sullivan,
supra note 99.
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criminal misconduct.102 Such cooperation is practically necessary,
given the degree to which the corporation controls, or can obtain, rel-
evant information about misconduct. Imposing a duty on the corpora-
tion to provide this assistance will help clarify the firm's own
involvement in the activity at issue. To be sure, some may find this
procedural answer an inadequate justification for broad corporate
criminal liability. Indeed, this is a rather extreme case of criminal law
being used-perhaps misused-as a jurisdiction grant. The point is
simply that the normative status of trade-offs between the govern-
ment's power to charge and corporate control of investigative infor-
mation is up for grabs. 10 3
Although there is no clear doctrinal bar to effectively deputizing
corporate counsel as prosecutorial information gatherers, one aspect
of the process may well have doctrinal consequences that courts are
now exploring. Relying on Garrity v. New Jersey,' °4 some white-collar
defense counsel have argued that, where U.S. Attorneys "insist[] that
[a] company use its disciplinary authority to encourage cooperation,
an employee subsequently might seek to preclude the use of his state-
ments against him on that ground that such statements were the prod-
uct of governmental coercion and thus were obtained in violation of
his Fifth Amendment rights."'1 5  Indeed, two defendants in the
KPMG case convinced Judge Kaplan to suppress their statements to
prosecutors on the theory that the government had "quite deliberately
coerced, and in any case significantly encouraged, KPMG to pressure
its employees to surrender their Fifth Amendment rights."10 6
Whether Judge Kaplan's rationale would extend to statements ob-
102. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383 (2002);
see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
103. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity
Criminal Liability, 81 ID. L.J. 473 (2006).
104. Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); see McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 40
(2002) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) (characterizing Garrity as a case that "involved free
citizens given the choice between invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege and sustaining their
economic livelihood").
105. Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. Rubin, DOJ Reaffirms and Expands Aggressive Corpora-
tion Cooperation Guidelines. 18 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 11 (Apr. 4. 2005): accord Earl J. Silbert
& Demme Doufekias Joannou. Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate
Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1225. 1233-34 (2006) (noting
that "employees who are given the choice of either speaking with corporate investigators or
losing their jobs, often without being provided with their own counsel to discuss that choice and
under threat of having their statements to the company's lawyers disclosed to the government,"
are in the position of the defendant in Garrity). For a sustained discussion of the Garrity argu-
ment, see Griffin, supra note 45.
106. United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (appeal pending).
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tained by corporate counsel for the purposes of an internal investiga-
tion that would later be disclosed to the government is open to
question. After all, Kaplan had to distinguish his case from United
States v. Solomon, where the Second Circuit refused to treat a bro-
ker's interrogation during a New York Stock Exchange disciplinary
hearing as the equivalent of government interrogation.'0 7 That an in-
ternal investigation is conducted in the shadow of a government
agency's regulatory capability is not enough to transform it into state
action, particularly where corporate agents initiated the questioning of
employees for corporate purposes. 10 8
As is so often the case in unsettled common law territory, the issue
is one of dueling analogies. On one hand, the government is harnes-
sing private power for a public purpose to the detriment of someone
with comparatively less private power. On the other, the government
is simply requiring that the corporation demand and deliver informa-
tion that the corporation "owns"' 1 9 and that it use all the means le-
gally available to do so." 0 As Professor Buell noted, "Judge Kaplan's
theory . .. requires a means of determining (1) the degree of state
involvement that renders the employer's conduct state action, and (2)
the degree of employer action that renders that action compulsion.
These are hard lines to draw and to control once drawn.""'
B. Institutional Choices
Opponents of the waiver regime see the absence of constitutional
and common law guidance on this sensitive issue as cause for legisla-
tive intervention. Legislative assistance may be on the way in the
form of Senator Specter's bill, which, among other things, would bar
the government from demanding the waiver of an organizational at-
torney-client privilege and bar it from considering an entity's assertion
107. Id. at 328 (distinguishing United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1975)).
But see Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1641
(2007) (noting that Garrity "has not been extended even to statements extracted by private em-
ployers, licensors, and the like whose activities are routinely intertwined with state action, in-
cluding the investigation and sanctioning of violations of the law").
108. See United States v. Garlock. 19 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a private
employer who investigated employee misconduct and reported the results did not automatically
become a state actor).
109. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Stein (KPMG Case), 440 F. Supp.
2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
110. See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 Si. JOHN's L. REV. 979, 1008 (2002) (noting that "[c]orporations don't cooper-
ate; people do").
111. Buell, supra note 107, at 1641.
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of that privilege when deciding whether to pursue criminal charges or
civil sanctions.' 12 There are certain technical aspects of this legislation
that need to be ironed out, but there is, to put it mildly, something to
be said for democratically elected bodies taking the laboring oar in
resolving hard public policy questions."13
Given how frequently and cogently Congress is faulted for abdicat-
ing its responsibilities on federal criminal issues,114 it may seem odd to
argue that Congress should stay its legislative hand on this particular
one. But, in a world in which Congress has generally stood back while
procedural rights are waived by those seeking to avoid or mitigate
extremely harsh criminal sanctions, the question becomes whether the
case for legislative involvement is any stronger here than elsewhere' 15
The case seems a lot weaker. If there were any place to fairly expect a
satisfactory equilibrium through informal or formal internal checks on
prosecutorial discretion and formal or informal interaction between
prosecutors and repeat player institutions, it would be here. One need
not be a wholehearted adherent of public choice theory to worry that
legislative line drawing will not be in the public interest where sub-
stantial corporate interests are involved on the defense side and no
lobby but the Justice Department on the other.116
Moreover, if Congress is interested in tinkering with or radically
reshaping the corporate criminal enforcement environment, it should
not operate in a piecemeal fashion. Indeed, the attorney-client waiver
"problem" ought to appear at the bottom of a long list of interrelated
issues, including the scope of corporate liability, the scope of corpo-
rate privileges, and the funding of white-collar enforcement units.
112. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S.186, 110th Cong. (2007).
113. The bill would, among other things, allow every indicted corporation to impose costs on
the government by claiming, with or without foundation, that the decision to prosecute was
motivated by impermissible considerations. See McNulty Memo Hearing, supra note 1, Written
Testimony of Daniel Richman, available at http:/ljudiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2886&
witid=6656.
114. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469 (1996); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforce-
ment Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
115. Congress has, for example, shown little interest in resolving the debate over the extent to
which prosecutors can require. as a precondition for cooperation discussions, that individual
defendants give up their right to bar the government from introducing their proffer statements at
trial. See United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Stein, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11141 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005); United States v. Krilich, 163 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947
(N.D. 11. 2001): Naftalis, supra note 79.
116. This statement betrays the author's biases with respect to the McDade Amendment, now
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B. See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the "American Criminal Class":
Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 650-56.
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Moreover, before addressing this list, it would be helpful if Congress
had a better sense of the current enforcement level than that provided
by hearings at which Administration officials boast of corporate scalp-
ings and corporate defenders tell of the dreaded chill.
There is one caveat. There are good arguments for legislative inter-
vention to ensure that the entity forced to waive is not unfairly disad-
vantaged vis-A-vis private plaintiffs.1 17 Currently, only the Eighth
Circuit has held that a company's disclosure of privileged materials in
response to government investigative demands will not result in its
complete waiver of privilege as to all other parties under federal
law.1 18 Acting at Congress's request, the Evidence Rules Committee
of the Judicial Conference recently considered a new evidence rule
that would allow selective waiver, freeing corporations to fully coop-
erate with the government, while maintaining the ability to assert the
privilege against private plaintiffs." 9 Such plaintiffs would still re-
ceive the benefit of offensive collateral estoppel should the govern-
ment bring and prevail on criminal charges and the far earlier benefit
of the signal of merit that news of a pending criminal investigation
provides. But they would be deprived of the privileged parts of the
government's investigative haul, particularly in those cases in which
the government investigates but never brings charges.
Reasonable minds may, and have, differed on this point. But the
calculus of a company considering whether to placate the government
with a waiver or risk prosecution is vastly complicated where the con-
sequence of waiver, even in the absence of criminal wrongdoing, is
exposure to private litigation. Whether out of concern that fears of
this perhaps unwarranted exposure may chill cooperation with the
government or out of a sense of "simple fairness" that recognizes the
unique degree of coercion involved in the waiver decision and the spe-
117. For arguments favoring limited waiver and legislation, see Terwilliger & Lew, supra note
56.
118. Compare Diversified Indus.. Inc., v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), with In re
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
119. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 502(c) reads as follows:
In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication or information cov-
ered by the attorney-client or work product protection-when made to a federal public
office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement author-
ity-does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-govern-
mental persons or entities.
Letter from Jerry E. Smith, Chair Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules to David F. Levi,
Chair Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 15, 2006), http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf.
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cial institutional features of public agencies, 120 Congress might well
strike a more appropriate balance than the one that courts have struck
following common law principles that far predate modern enforce-
ment practices. 121
Given these concerns, one might expect groups like the Association
of Corporate Counsel to support the proposed Federal Rule. The As-
sociation has opposed it, however, and it appears that their opposition
will be successful. 122 Their rationale seems to be that any attempt to
resolve the selective waiver problem might make government waiver
demands or expectations palatable, possibly more frequent, and cer-
tainly more defensible in Congress. Senator Specter's legislative pro-
posal and the Justice Department's recent efforts to limit prosecutors
in this area suggest that the strategy is paying off.
This brinksmanship on the part of the Association of Corporate
Counsel highlights a more general theme of corporate prosecutions.
With certain notable exceptions, they often involve a sophisticated
game of "chicken. ' 123 Notwithstanding the breadth of the law on cor-
porate criminal liability, the government rarely has much interest in
actually bringing charges against an entity based on the criminal con-
duct of its agents. Substantial-albeit unequal-stigma can be im-
posed on the entity through civil sanctions, as well as fines, penalties,
and forfeitures. Particularly where the collateral consequences of a
corporate conviction are contractual debarment or worse, civil pro-
ceedings will avoid or limit the harm to innocent or relatively innocent
third parties. 124
Sending someone to prison is not the sine qua non of criminal pros-
ecutions, but it is the gold standard, and prosecutors would far prefer
going after individuals to seeking a corporate conviction. Threatening
to prosecute the entity itself is a means to that end, for, without this
120. See Fordham U. Sch. of Law, Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Pro-
posal 502, Testimony of N. . Deputy Att'y Gen. Peter B. Pope, at 57-65 (Apr. 24, 2006), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EVHearing._April-2006.pdf.
121. See Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A
Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, at 37 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Paper No. 1485,
2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6665&context=expresso.
122. See Letter of Susan Hackett, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n of Corp.
Counsel, to Judge David F. Levi (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.acc.com/public/policy/atty
client/accfre502comments.pdf. On September 26, 2007, the Judicial Conference's Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure notified Congress that it would not propose a selective waiver
provision. See Letter of Lee H. Rosenthal. Chair of Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
to Senators Patrick J. Leahy & Arlen Specter, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Hill
Letter reEV_502.pdf.
123. See DOUGLAs G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 303-04 (1994).
124. See Brown, supra note 102.
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threat, the entity would be far more tempted to protect the individuals
and indeed may still do so if the individuals have sufficient sway
within the organization. But an actual prosecution will generally be a
sign that something has gone wrong-perhaps real or perceived recal-
citrance by the corporation that the government takes as both a fail-
ure to cooperate and a sign of a "culture" of wrongdoing within the
organization. 125
For their part, corporate employees will find themselves in the usual
Prisoner's Dilemma with each other and the corporate entity, each
with an incentive to gain the benefits of cooperation with the govern-
ment at the expense of the others. But, vis-A-vis the government, they
are also playing a game of chicken, essentially hoping that the govern-
ment, out of concern for third-party interests, such as those of share-
holders and customers, will swerve away from prosecuting or credibly
threatening to prosecute the entity. If anyone has to take a plea, how-
ever, better the organization than the individual-at least from the
individual's perspective.
These bargaining dynamics are mirrored in policy discussions about
privilege waivers and, for that matter, corporate deferred prosecu-
tions. 126 These measures let prosecutors obtain the fruits of
threatened criminal charges, while making it less likely that the gov-
ernment will have to actually pull the trigger on firms and inflict sig-
nificant injury to third parties. Those who would eliminate such half
measures of demonstrably credible cooperation presumably would
like the government to confront just this dilemma. Assuming that the
consequent prosecutorial investigative disadvantages were not cured
by a massive increase in enforcement resources-a fair assumption-
the consequence, for good or ill, would be fewer corporate prosecu-
tions and less pressure on firms to assist in the prosecution of their
employees.
It is against this extraordinary backdrop-substantive law that per-
mits entities to be easily prosecuted where no one really wants them
prosecuted-that the debate about corporate waivers takes place. But
it is not only on the substantive law side that there may be a large gap
between black-letter law and societal interests. Just as there are good
125. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473,
476 (2006) ("[I]n the shadow of a strikingly broad de jure rule of liability that is nearly indistin-
guishable from its civil counterparts, the criminal system's actors gradually have developed a
practice of imposing enterprise liability that looks much narrower and is tied to a form of height-
ened criminal responsibility.").
126. See Garrett, supra note 101; see also Daniel Richman, Institutional Competence and Or-
ganization Prosecutions, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 101 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2007/06/18/richman.pdf.
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arguments that corporate criminal liability is far too expansive, so too
are there good arguments that corporate attorney-client privilege doc-
trine sweeps far too broadly.12 7
These substantive and procedural doctrines have much in common.
Both are judicial constructs, established with minimal consideration of
social costs and rooted less in logic than in contestable analogies: on
the liability side, between civil and criminal liability; on the privilege
side, between individual and organizational needs. 128 Two wrongs do
not necessarily make a right. 29 Nor can one make a good a priori
case that the clash between two contestable doctrines will produce a
socially beneficial result. Particularly in a criminal justice system so
bedeviled by resource imbalances and transaction costs, one generally
has no reason to expect that the assignment of expansive defaults to
each side will lead to bargaining that produces some normatively ac-
ceptable result. But the institutional frameworks here-to which we
will now turn-allow a powerful case to be made for organic develop-
ment and legislative abstention, with the government drawing on its
substantive law power to extract procedural benefits from organiza-
tional entities.
Once we consider that this is not an exercise in legislative line draw-
ing but a pragmatic matter of institutional choice, we will need to
think harder about the institutions involved, particularly on the gov-
ernment side. Corporations will frequently find it in their own inter-
est to proffer privileged materials to prosecutors, even in the absence
of explicit requests, so as to. signal the extent of their cooperation and
perhaps shorten the length and depth of the government's investiga-
tion. This will be true regardless of the government's waiver policy.
These decisions, however, are presumably made in the face of the gov-
ernment's policy framework. If not, one is left mystified by the inten-
sity of corporate lobbying against the Thompson Memo. What
considerations should go into setting this framework? How does one
choose between the Thompson Memo approach-which gives a high
degree of discretion to U.S. Attorneys' offices-the McNulty Memo-
127. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 217-33 (1988); Brown,
Jr., supra note 46, at 924; Daniel R. Fischel. Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1998): Rothstein. supra note 72. Julie O'Sullivan addresses those arguments in a piece for this
Symposium. See O'Sullivan. supra note 20.
128. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.5.3 (1986); Brown, supra note
46; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Cli-
ent Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1993).
129. I have frequently made this point to my kids, usually when they are sitting together in the
car on long trips.
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which purports to, and may well, rein in those offices-and other pos-
sible administrative arrangements?
To the extent that one seeks careful calibration of government pres-
sure, there are good arguments for leaving decisions about such cali-
bration in the hands of line prosecutors and their enforcement agency
partners 13 0-the personnel best placed to assess the extent to which a 7
corporation has been forthcoming and the need for additional internal
information. Some degree of supervisory regulation seems necessary,
however, because it is unrealistic to expect a line assistant to resist the
chance to look at the other side's cards and perhaps even have her
investigation done for her, often by a more experienced former assis-
tant representing the corporation. The question thus becomes how
many levels should be involved in the ex ante approval process?
There are degrees of supervision within districts, but putting these
wrinkles aside, the issue becomes whether control should rest in the
district or be shared with Washington. Delegation of decision-making
power to the districts has costs. The risk that policies will differ across
districts is inherent in such a system, although the extent of district
independence varies from district to district and from administration
to administration.' 3' Expertise will vary across districts too, and Main
Justice can help ensure that waiver demands are not overused substi-
tutes for prosecutorial diligence and professionalism.
Yet centralized decision making has downsides too. As Dan Kahan
suggested, the political leadership at the Justice Department is far
more apt than U.S. Attorneys to "internalize" the costs of
prosecutorial decision making. 132 U.S. Attorneys trying to advance
their local political careers, or Assistants trying to cut their profes-
sional teeth on conspicuous white-collar targets, 33 might give too lit-
tle thought to the economic value their cases can burn up. On the
other hand, Main Justice may give too much, because the able defense
lawyers and lobbyists who will decry "prosecutorial overreaching" will
not always have counterparts clearly setting out the economic gains
130. See Richman, supra note 4.
131. See Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & David S. Schumacher, Attorney-Client Privilege on the Re-
bound?, 20 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 1 (June 2006) (criticizing a policy that gives "each U.S. At-
torney's Office ... discretion to draft its own procedures, leaving defense counsel subject to the
whims of the jurisdiction in which they are practicing, unfettered by uniform, national limits");
see also Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department
of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. Louis U. L. 1 (2006).
132. Kahan, supra note 114, at 497.
133. See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives
of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005); Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecu-
tors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 259
(2000).
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that can flow from aggressive enforcement. 134 With current priorities
in the areas of counterterrorism and immigration and the odd dy-
namic that has made violent-crime enforcement a non-negotiable part
of the federal enforcement agenda,1 35 Main Justice's institutional com-
mitment to white-collar cases may be at a low, or lower, ebb. 136
The point about institutional commitment may seem odd to those
struck by the post-Enron rhetoric of the "war on corporate crime."' 137
Indeed, the Justice Department's Corporate Fraud Task Force regu-
larly touts the number of firms and executives charged and convicted
through its efforts. 138 Recent reports and news stories about the de-
ployment of federal resources and the view of high-level Justice De-
partment decision making allowed by the recent flap over the fired
U.S. Attorneys paints a different picture, however-one in which re-
source-strapped districts face constant pressure from Washington to
boost their statistics with respect to firearms and immigration cases
and have little incentive to pursue the resource-intensive and compar-
atively slow work of white-collar criminal enforcement. The budget
pressure on U.S. Attorneys' offices is one of the undercovered stories
of recent years, one that the department leadership, at the time of this
writing, apparently prefers remains so. 139
134. The exception is the mass hysteria that immediately follows savings & loan or Enron-
type scandals.
135. See Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, in 34
CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 377, 416 (Michael Tonry ed., 2006) (noting the
federal government's continuing efforts in the arena of violent crime following the terrorist at-
tacks of 9/11.
136. See Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' De-
fense Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part 1), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 55 (2006) (noting that the
"political dynamic for white collar criminal enforcement is much more fickle [than that for street
crime]" and discussing how the "operational features of white collar crime also blunt
enforcement").
137. See Griffin, supra note 45, at 313; John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through
Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 348 (2004).
138. See CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (July
20, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd-yr-fraud-report.pdf; see also Daniel C. Richman &
William J. Stuntz, A/ Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prose-
cution. 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 613-14 (2005) (discussing the challenge of formulating ade-
quate performance measures for federal white-collar enforcement).
139. I completed the final edits on this Article in early November 2007. Also note that, when
the soon-to-be fired U.S. Attorney for Western Washington, John McKay, announced that his
office was "stressed to the limit" and "down" six prosecutors (in an office of fifty-eight), the
ensuing newspaper story by Paul Shukovsky and Daniel Lathrop, see supra note 90, immediately
sparked angry emails among top staffers in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General. See
Email from Michael Elston to Monica Goodling & Paul McNulty (Sept. 22, 2006), and Email
from Brian Roehkrasse to Michael Elston et al. (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://judici-
ary.house.gov/Media/PDFS/DOJDocsPt3-070320.pdf; see also Anthony M. Destefano, Case of
Shrinking Prosecutions, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2007 (noting that the Eastern District of New York
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One need not make any assumptions about the relative commit-
ments to corporate crime enforcement of Washington and the districts
to expect that any involvement of Washington in waiver decisions will
be in a restrictive direction. This effect is inherent in the involvement
of an entity that only sees cases in which a U.S. Attorney's office
wants to seek waiver-unless the districts respond to increased over-
sight by exercising less discretion. 140 The effect is magnified by -the
bureaucratic imperative that tends to make monitoring agencies jus-
tify their existence.
It remains to be seen whether the "consultation" that the McNulty
Memo requires of U.S. Attorneys' offices will be a mere formality-in
which case, the fanfare with which the Memo was unveiled was simply
a transparent ploy to pacify critics-or a means by which the Criminal
Division makes its influence felt on a regular basis. Perhaps it will
lead to an exercise in "new governance," with Washington presiding
over experimentation in the districts and promoting the adoption of
"best practices."' 141 However, the substantial risk that the new policy
will chill prosecutors' abilities to gain the help of corporations in iden-
tifying individual wrongdoers, at a time when the Department's com-
mitment to white-collar enforcement is under significant strain, should
not be ignored.
Moreover, we should not forget that, for all the disputes about the
world created by the Thompson Memo, the Memo itself is a success
story in federal criminal law, where clarity in the principles that guide
prosecutors' charging discretion has always been elusive. To be sure,
as Judge Lynch suggested, 142 it is inevitable that among repeat players
a common law of prosecution will emerge. But the guidance provided
by Justice Department promulgations in the corporate area has been
exceptional and praiseworthy. Supporters of horizontal equity might
140. See C.F. Larry Heimann, Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Struc-
ture and the Design of Reliable Systems, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 421, 427 (1993).
141. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Liti-
gation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning
from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, in
EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE PAPERS (2007), http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-con-
nex-C-07-02.pdf. Professor Simon made several recommendations:
Some of the same mechanisms of transparency and accountability that the new regula-
tory regimes impose on businesses are readily adaptable to the conduct of agencies and
prosecutors themselves. Prosecutors should articulate standards for the exercise of dis-
cretion, measure their own performance under the standards, provide transparent pro-
cedures for revising the standards in the light of experience, and provide remedies for
targets that believe they have been harmed by violations of the standards.
Simon, supra note 57, at 1469-70.
142. Lynch, supra note 3.
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dislike the idea that corporations receive more guidance than regular
defendants, but corporations are different. This is a class of defendant
that the government generally does not want to, and generally should
not, prosecute. It would be ironic if the decision to promulgate and
publicize guidance to line prosecutions made one sensitive enforce-
ment area particularly amenable to wholesale-not retail-political
interference 143 and thus gave prosecutors one more reason to love the
"just do the right thing" ethos144 that dominates most of the Principles
of Federal Prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
Although we will soon see changes in the Justice Department's
leadership, there is no reason to expect-under any Administration-
that the interests of corporate managers in policing their own houses
will not be given due deference by the Department. At the same time,
there is good reason to be concerned about a structural bias in the
flow of information to Congress and other policymakers. At some dis-
tant point-perhaps after some future scandal-groups representing
shareholders, workers, and other dispersed beneficiaries of white-col-
lar criminal enforcement might come forward to join the Department
in opposing efforts to give extraordinary waiver protection to corpo-
rate privileges. Coalitions of private lawyers and corporate interests
are far more easily mobilized on this issue, however. While their
viewpoints are, of course, understandable, they ought not be allowed
to dominate decision making.
It is true that an outsider would find the world of federal criminal
law very strange. It is an odd combination of overly broad statutes
and harsh punishments set against an array of rights and privileges
that are generally traded for leniency or nonprosecution. It is also
true that both the substantive law of corporate criminal liability and
the evidentiary protections offered to corporations by the attorney-
client and work-product privileges may be in need of recalibration.
But, in the absence of any congressional commitment to this worthy
project, the targeting for legislative action of this one part of the
white-collar enforcement regime is troubling and, at least in the ab-
sence of far more information than is currently available, unnecessary.
143. Cf. Frank 0. Bowman 111, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of
Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2005) (suggesting that the specificity and
complexity of the Sentencing Guidelines gave Congress a vehicle for unduly interfering in the
sentencing process).
144. See David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 509 (1999).
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